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RECENT DECISIONS
strued to be synonymous, 9 as in the case at bar, and in other in-
stances, the courts have held them to be diverse.' 0
V. G. R.
TRUSTS---SoLE RISK" OF CORPORATE TRUSTEE.-The appellant
bank was a trustee under a trust deed that permitted it to invest in
certain so-called "non-legals." It invested in its own mortgage par-
ticipations, two of which did not mature till after the period for
which the trust was limited. When the trust period expired, the
beneficiary was offered the participations which, owing to conditions
surrounding the real estate market, were worthless. He brought
suit, claiming that the investments were imprudently and negligently
made and that the bank guaranteed its investments under the New
York Banking Law.' Held, that the investments were not impru-
'Residence and domicile are generally construed as synonymous when used
in the Constitution or in statutes relating to voting, eligibility for office, juris-
diction in divorce, probate and administration. Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U. S.
529, 11 Sup. Ct. 414 (1891); De Meli v. De Meli, supra note 3; Bell v. Pierce,
51 N. Y. 12 (1872) ; see Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Ives, 21 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 67, 3 N. Y. Supp. 895 (1889).
Eligibility for office: People v. Platt, 117 N. Y. 159, 22 N. E. 936 (1889).
Matrimonial actions: De Meli v. De Meli, supra note 3. Matter of succession
and transfer taxes: In re Martin's Estate, 173 App. Div. 1, 158 N. Y. Supp.
915 (1st Dept. 1916) ; In re Wise's Estate, 146 N. Y. Supp. 789 (1914). Venue:
Klenrock v. Nantex Manufacturing Co., 201 App. Div. 236, 194 N. Y. Supp.
142 (2d Dept. 1922); cf. Johnson v. Hoile, 205 App. Div. 633, 199 N. Y. Supp.
875 (2d Dept. 1923). Contra: Lyon v. Lyon, 30 Hun 455 (N. Y. 1883). In
this case, at page 456, the court says: "The section of the code referred to
(§984 C. C. P. now §182 C. P. A.) makes the residence of the parties the
controlling fact in fixing the place of trial. This means actual residence and
not necessarily the domicile of one of the parties."
""Residence in attachment laws generally implies an established abode,
fixed permanently for a time, for business or other purposes, although there
may be an intent existing all the while to return to the true domicile." Weit-
kamp v. Weitkamp, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 79 at 82-3 (1886). Hislop v. Taaffe,
141 App. Div. 40, 125 N. Y. Supp. 614 (2d Dept. 1910); Zenatello v. Pons, 235
App. Div. 221, 256 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1st Dept. 1932).
'N. Y. BANING LAw (1933) §188, subd. 7. "All investments of money
received by any such corporation, and by any trust company * * * as * * *
testamentary trustee * * * shall be at its sole risk, and for all losses of such
money the capital stock, property and effects of the corporation shall be abso-
lutely liable, unless the investments are such as are proper when made by an
individual acting as trustee * * * or such as are permitted in and by the instru-
ment or words creating or defining the trust. Investments in bond and mort-
gage by any such corporation as * * * testamentary trustee * * * may be made
by apportioning or by transferring to any estate or fund so held a part interest
in a bond and mortgage held by or in the name of such corporation * * * •
but such bond and mortgage shall be a legal investment for trustees under the
laws of this state * * *."
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dently and negligently made and that the bank did not become a
guarantor. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Flint - A. D. -,
269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2nd Dept., 1934).
The investing of trust funds in real estate mortgage securities
was early recognized.2 The use of participations in trust funds was
held not to be a violation of the trustee's duty. 3 The mere fact that
two of the participations did not mature till after the expiration
of the trust did not place the trust in such unrecallable shape as
would violate the rule,4 especially inasmuch as at the time they were
purchased, they were readily marketable for full value. The rapid
decline of real estate values was unpredictable and unavoidable.
Hence, no negligence could be imputed to the bank on that score.
"At its own risk" r applies to corporate trustees in lieu of the
bond required of the individual trustee.6 At any rate, that condition
does not apply where the investment is permitted by the trust in-
denture.7
The trustee was never allowed to deal with himself in investing
trust funds, such transactions being set aside regardless of whether
or not they benefited the beneficiary, lest by making exceptions the
court permit the rule of undivided loyalty from trustee to beneficiary
to be eroded.8 This is still the law except where changed by statute.
The New York Banking Law permits the corporate trustee to deal
with itself by complying with certain conditions, one of which is that
the investments be legal under "the laws of the state." 9 The in-
vestment in "non-legal" mortgage participations was held to conform
with this description. 10
It is well settled that a statute which gives a privilege unknown
to the Common Law, or enlarges one already present, by implica-
tion, forbids it to be done in any other way, even though that other
way should be better."
J. D. G.
2 King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, 83 (1869).
'Barry v. Lambert, 98 N. Y. 300 (1885); Matter of Union Trust Co., 219
N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916).
'Marczak v. Brooklyn City R. R., 237 App. Div. 841, 261 N. Y. Supp. 27
(2d Dept. 1932); Behrens v. Brooklyn City R. R., 237 App. Div. 836, 261
N. Y. Supp. 914 (2d Dept. 1932).
'Supra note 1.
N. Y. SUR. CT. ACT (1920) §97.
Supra note 1.
'Wendt v. Fisher, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928).
Supra note 1.
to Instant case.
Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148 (1860) ; People ex rel. Flatbush Gas
Co. v. Cooler, 190 N. Y. 268, 83 N. E. 18 (1907) ; In re Hering, 196 N. Y. 218,
89 N. E. 450 (1909); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. N. Y., 239 N. Y. 595, 147
N. E. 210 (1924) ; Loewy v. Gordon, 129 App. Div. 459, 114 N. Y. Supp. 211
(2d Dept. 1908).
